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Abstract — In the next years the data transmission 
connections will constitute one of the principal tools of 
communication among cities, enterprises and public 
administration. With their enhanced connectivity, the systems 
and nets of information are now exposed to an increased 
vulnerability and new safety problems are emerging. Insofar 
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) has matured to real world 
applications and can enhance the safety of the communication 
nets. In this paper we present the QKD network designed and 
implemented by Selex-SI and we give an overview of the 
obtained results. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
N the next years the data transmission connections will 
constitute one of the principal tools of communication 
among cities, enterprises and public administration. Personal 
computers more and more powerful, convergent technologies 
and an ample use of Internet have replaced the precedents 
“autonomous systems” with limited working abilities, 
predominantly restricted to closed nets. Today, the interested 
parties are widely interconnected and the connections 
overcome the national confinements. Besides, Internet is the 
support for vital infrastructures as energy, transports and 
financial activities, and it revolutionized the way in which 
enterprises manage their own activities, the governments 
assure the services to the citizens and the enterprises and the 
citizens communicate and exchange information. The nature 
of the technologies that constitute the infrastructure of 
communications and information have recorded a similar 
notable evolution. So the typologies, the volume and the 
sensitive character of the exchanged information are 
increased in a substantial way. With their enhanced 
connectivity, the systems and nets of information are now 
exposed to an increased number and a wider range of threats 
and vulnerabilities and, therefore, new safety problems are 
emerging. Insofar the cryptography and the safety of the nets 
are matured, bringing to the development of practical and 
easy to use applications. Nowadays, the Protection of the Net 
can use both standard algorithms (DES, 3-DES, RSA) and 
proprietary algorithms. Keys of encryption of suitable length 
are used to guarantee the strength of both the Reservation 
(Strong Encryption) and the Authentication (Strong 
Authentication). Nevertheless, the oldest and more delicate 
problem connected to the conventional systems of encryption 
remains the management of the keys. In fact, this is an 
essential component of a good operation of every 
cryptographic system, and it includes the generation, the 
possible maintenance and the dispatch to the legitimate 
recipients. In each of these phases a security loss can 
jeopardize the whole structure. In other words the 
management of the keys represents the true Achilles’ heel of   
every military or civil cryptographic system. The keys owe 
therefore to undergo two antithetical and contradictory 
demands: to stay secret and protected, and to be replaced 
as more frequently as be possible.  
A key of encryption consists of a string of casual bits. Such 
string is useful only if the perfect randomness is assured, it is 
known only to the authorized users and it is regularly 
renewed.  
Quantum Cryptography permits to solve all these problems, 
allowing the distribution of couples of identical keys in a sure 
way, guaranteeing their perfect randomness and, therefore, 
providing the One-Time-Pad encryption [1-3]. This new 
technology can play a fundamental role for the protection of 
the so-called Critical National Infrastructures (CNI), that are 
a key component of the national security in numerous 
countries, and, in the United States, an issue at the centre of 
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Figure 1. The Q-KeyMaker. 
 2
the debate on terrorism and Security since September 11. 
CNI are in fact based on Critical Information 
Infrastructures (CII). CII must allow the correct CNI working 
under normal conditions of operation, guarantee a suitable 
operational ability in case of critical events, and assure an 
elevated degree of security. Moreover, the recent 
developments in the quantum technologies, particularly of 
Quantum Computers, constitute a sword of Damocle on the 
modern cryptography and one possible use of them is destined 
to bring a great revolution. 
Here we present the Q-KeyMaker, a four-user QKD 
network in a star configuration, i.e. with one server (Galileo) 
and three clients (Benjamin, Copernico and Keplero), based 
on decoy-state method. 
 
II. PRACTICAL QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY WITH DECOY 
STATE: THE Q-KEYMAKER 
 
Practical QKD systems can differ in many important 
aspects from their original theoretical proposal that typically 
demand technologies that are beyond our present 
experimental capability. Especially, the signals emitted by the 
source, instead of being single photons, are usually Weak 
Coherent Pulses (WCP), with typical average photon numbers 
of 0.1 or higher. The quantum channel introduces errors and 
considerable attenuation (about 0.2dB/km) that affect the 
signals even when Eve is not present. Besides, for telecom 
wavelengths, standard InGaAs single-photon detectors can 
have detection efficiency below 15% and are noisy due to 
dark counts. All these differences reduce the security of the 
protocols, and lead to limitations of the rate and the 
maximum distance that can be covered by these techniques 
[4]. A main security threat of practical QKD schemes based 
on WCP arises from the fact that some signals contain more 
than one photon prepared in the same state. For this reason 
Eve is no longer limited by the no-cloning theorem [5] since 
in these events the signal itself provides her with perfect 
copies of the signal photon. She can perform, for instance, the 
so called photon number splitting (PNS) attack on the multi-
photon pulses [4]. This attack gives Eve full information 
about the part of the key generated with the multi-photon 
signals, without causing any disturbance in the signal. As a 
result, it turns out that the standard BB84 protocol [6] with 
WCP can deliver a key generation rate of order O(η2), where 
η (<<1) denotes the transmission efficiency of the quantum 
channel [7, 8]. To achieve higher secure key rates over longer 
distances, different QKD schemes, that are robust against the 
PNS attack, have been proposed in recent years [9 -13]. One 
of these schemes is the so-called decoy state QKD [9 -11] 
where Alice varies, independently and at random, the mean 
photon number of each signal state that she sends to Bob, by 
employing different intensity settings. 
Eve does not know a priori the mean photon number of 
each signal state sent by Alice. This means that her 
eavesdropping strategy can only depend on the photon 
number of these signals, but not on the particular intensity 
setting used to generate them. From the measurements 
corresponding to different intensity settings, the legitimate 
users can estimate the classical joint probability distribution 
describing their outcomes for each photon number state. This 
gives them a better estimation of the behavior of the quantum 
channel, and enhances the achievable secret key rate and 
distance. This technique has been successfully implemented 
in several recent experiments [14], and it can give a key 
generation rate of order O(η) [9 - 11]. 
The Selex-SI Q-KeyMaker is a plug and play auto-
compensating system (see Fig.2). It employs a pulse (λ=1550 
nm) emitted by Galileo’s laser diode at a frequency of 4 MHz. 
The pulse is split at a first 50/50 Beam-Splitter (BS). The two 
resulting pulses impinge the two input ports of a Polarizing 
Beam Splitter (PBS), after traveling, respectively, through a 
short and a long arm of an unbalanced interferometer (MZ). 
The linear polarization is turned by 900 in the long arm, so 
that the two pulses exit the PBS through the same port. The 
separated pulses travel down to one of the three clients, 
selected by a micro mirror optical switch, they are reflected 
 
Figure 2. The QKD network (see text for details). 
 
Figure 3. The optimal value µ is chosen taking into account the length of the 
single mode fiber link and the current QBER of the channel. 
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on a Faraday Mirror and come back orthogonally polarized 
and codified in phase by a Phase Modulator (PhM). A 
Polarization Independent LiNbO3 switch (VOS) then allows 
to prepare and control the Signal state (with an average 
number of photons equal to µ) and the two Decoy states (ν 
and vacuum). The optimal value of µ and ν is chosen taking 
into account the length of the single mode fiber link (15km 
Benjamin, 21km Copernico and 25Km Keplero) and the 
current QBER of the channel (see Fig.3-4). 
In turn, both pulses take now the other path at Bob’s 
interferometer and arrive simultaneously at the first BS, 
where they interfere. Finally they are detected by InGaAs 
Avalanche Photon Detectors (D0, D1). A clock signal, 
synchronized with the transmitter, controls the measurement 
basis choice for the phase modulator located in the 
unbalanced fiber Mach-Zender (MZ) interferometer on the 
server’s side, the gating signals (2.5ns) for the InGaAs 
detectors D0 and D1 (15% quantum efficiency) and a second 
pulsed laser (λ =1310 nm) for client’s device synchronization. 
Decoy pulse QKD theory gives a rigorous bound for the 
characteristics of the single photon pulses, which are the only 
source pulses that contribute to the secure bit rate. In decoy 
protocol, three different average pulse intensities (referred to 
as Signal, Decoy pulse and Vacuum) with mean photon 
numbers µ, v (µ > v) and 0 are used. Our setting for the 
proportion of three transmitted states is 14:1:1 among the 
signal state, decoy state and vacuum state. By using the 
results of [13, 15] we obtain the following key generation 
rate: 
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Qµ = Y0+1-e-ηµ and Eµ are, respectively, the measured gain and 
the quantum bit error rate (QBER) for the signal state; q is an 
efficiency factor for the protocol (q=0.5 for standard BB84); 
the H2(x) is the binary entropy function, while the factor f(x) 
takes into account the efficiency of the bidirectional error 
correction; Q1 and e1 are the unknown gain and the error rate 
of the true single photon state in signal states. To achieve the 
maximum possible key generation rate, the decoy state 
method gives an estimation of the lower bound of Q1 denoted 
as QL1, and the upper bound of e1 denoted as eU1. After 
experimentally measuring all the relevant parameters, we can 
input the following bounds for calculating the final key 
generation rate 
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where Y0 (see Fig.5) and ε0 represent, respectively, the 
background and the error rate (~0.5) when Vacuum state is 
set;  Eν and Qν = Y0+1-e-ην are the error and the gain for the 
Decoy State. The telecom single mode fibers have an average 
attenuation of about 0.2 dB per kilometer. Besides the 
transmission loss in the fiber, there are also other coupling 
and connection losses, principally 1.7 dB due to the 
polarization maintaining fiber in server’s side, optical switch 
and fiber connectors. The 70hh data set (see Fig.6-7) is a part 
of 150 days working and monitoring period during which 
similar results have been obtained: this shows the high 
reliability and stability of Q-KeyMaker. The Secure Key 
Generation Rate was of 5.8Kb/s for 25Km link (Keplero, 
Qber 3.2%), 8 Kb/s for 21Km link (Copernico, Qber 2.4%) 
and 11.5Kb/s for 15km link (Benjamin, Qber 2.7%). 
 
III. QKD NETWORK 
 
Few groups, such as BBN, have demonstrated quantum 
networks with three nodes or more. Phoenix et al. [16] 
proposed the concept of passive quantum networks. Such a 
network adopts passive optical couplers as network nodes to 
split photons sent by the transmitter, to more receivers. In this 
architecture, simultaneous communication, or “broadcast”, 
from one user to all others is established, and quantum key 
distribution between one user and any other one can be 
 
Figure 5. QBER behavior for the different links.  
 
Figure 4. Background noise for the different links. 
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realized. Townsend et al. [17] conceptually demonstrated that 
quantum key distribution is feasible between any couple of 
users within a passive quantum network. However, in the 
passive communication network, photons (and hence the bit 
that they represent) are split by couplers according to their 
ratio so that only a subset of these photons reach each 
terminal node. Therefore, the actual key rate between specific 
terminals is greatly reduced. In comparison, in the active 
QKD Selex-SI network configuration a controller actively 
drives an optical switch to set the communication direction 
(orientation). In this case, all photons emitted by Bob (except 
those lost in the link) are delivered to the selected terminal, 
yielding the full communication speed (therefore the highest 
quantum key rate) between two users in the network. The 
one-to-any structure is a natural extension of a four-node 
architecture obtained by replacing the 1 x 3 with a 1 x n 
optical switch. For a any-to-any architecture, optical cross 
connection (OXC) switches could be used to implement 
communications between any Alice and any Bob. After each 
switching operation, a time alignment procedure is necessary, 
which sums up to the communication time. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In summary, we reported the demonstration of an 
operational network QKD system: the full key exchange and 
application protocols were performed in real time among 
three clients and one server. The generated quantum keys can 
be immediately employed for ciphering applications.  
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Figure 6. Signal Gain for the different links.  
 
Figure 7. Secure Key Rate for the different links. 
